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Abstract
Military spending associated with wars has been a major cause of
government deficits and debt financing. This paper looks at the the asso-
ciation between debt and defence spending in the UK over the last three
centuries. The paper reviews the history, discusses the theory and pro-
vides some estimates of the effect of variations in military expenditure on
debt. The association tends to be quite close and the effect of the change
in the share of military spending in GDP on the debt-GDP ratio is quite
stable.
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1 Introduction
Over the longer span of history, a major cause of government deficits and the
accumulation of national debt has been military spending, primarily during war.
Before the 20th century the main expense of the sovereign was the military. This
paper examines the association between military spending and national debt in
the UK over the last three centuries. The UK has a long run of reasonably
good data, had volatile military spending as a result of its engagement in many
wars and at times had very high levels of debt relative to GDP. Barro (1987:
221) says "The British data from the early 1700s through World War I provide
an unmatched opportunity for studying the effects of temporary changes in
government purchases. Temporary increases, which appeared mainly as wartime
spending ..." The wars the UK was involved in over this period were international
or colonial wars, civil wars raise different issues. Slater (2018:196), in a history
of the national debt, concurs, "small temporary aberrations of expenditure and
taxation are dwarfed in the large war and peace story."
∗Forthcoming in the 30th anniversary issue of Defence and Peace Economics. I am grateful
to Ryland Thomas for help and advice on the data and to the editor, two referees, Veronika
Akhmadieva, Yunus Aksoy, Alastair Ball and Paul Dunne for comments.
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Consideration of national debt is interesting because there is a widespread
belief that national debt above a certain limit has a negative effect on the
economy. The European Union Maastricht criteria specifies that the government
debt to GDP ratio must not exceed 60%. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) estimate
a debt-threshold ratio, such that ratios above 90% have a negative effect on
growth, though this estimate has been widely criticised, for instance Herndon
et al. (2014). Chudik et al. (2017) using a sample of forty countries over the
period 1965-2010 find no evidence for a universally applicable threshold effect
in the relationship between public debt and economic growth, although they do
find significant negative effects of public debt buildup on output growth. Most
of this literature has focussed on the post World War II period, but in certain
respects this period is atypical of the longer historical record, and this longer
perspective can be informative. In a related paper, Smith (2019) examines the
effect of government debt on interest rates using a panel of 17 countries 1870-
2016.
While the literature has not established any clear relationship between debt
and growth, or between military expenditure and growth,1 there does seem to
be a clear historical association between military expenditure and debt. This
association is the focus of this paper. It reviews the history of the UK national
debt and military spending as shares of GDP, has a brief survey of some of
the theory and provides some estimates of the interaction. It should be noted
that there are substantial diffi culties with the measurement of all the variables
considered. The definition of Britain changed with the Act of Union with Scot-
land in 1707, and with Ireland in 1800 which created the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland. It became the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland again with the 1921 British recognition of the Irish Free
State in the South after the Irish war of independence from 1919. Since both
debt and military expenditure were central responsibilities, these changes are
probably not material. The offi cial debt figures used are at par, face value,
rather than at market value for much of the period, this is discussed by Barro
(1987) and Ellison & Scott (2019). There are also inevitable diffi culties with
measuring military expenditure, but the fact that it needed to be authorised by
votes in Parliament meant that defence spending was documented. The GDP
series have to be retrospectively constructed by economic historians from lim-
ited data. While these diffi culties are real, they are unlikely to change the basic
story because the variations in both the share of military expenditure in GDP
and of the debt-GDP ratio are so large.
2 History
Cicero, the Roman orator said "The sinews of war are infinite money". Over
the longer span of history, the infinite money required for military expenditures
1The conclusion of the critical review of the literature on the effect of military expenditure
on growth in Dunne et al. (2005) that there was no clear effect, seems to remain relevant.
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to provide the sinews of war has been a major cause of government deficits and
the accumulation of national debt.
Eichengreen et al. (2019) consider public debt from a long term histori-
cal perspective, showing how the purposes for which governments borrow have
evolved over time. Periods when debt-GDP ratios rose explosively as a result
of wars, depressions and financial crises also have a long history. Many of these
episodes resulted in debt-management problems resolved through debasements
and restructuring. There were also successful debt consolidations, where gov-
ernments inheriting heavy debts ran primary surpluses for long periods in order
to reduce those burdens to sustainable levels. They analyze the economic and
political circumstances that made these successful debt consolidation episodes
possible.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of debt to GDP taken from Bank of England (2017).
The origin of the national debt is usually dated from 1694 when William III used
a syndicate of merchants to sell debt to finance the Nine Years War. This syn-
dicate went on to become the Bank of England. Ellison & Scott (2019) provide
an overview of UK debt management and Slater (2018) provides a history of
the national debt. The jumps in the national debt largely correspond to wars,
followed by declines after the ends of wars. The debt-GDP ratio rises from zero
following a sawtooth pattern around a trend increase during the 18th century
until it peaks at 183% in 1816.
The 18th century was one of continual wars during which the share of mil-
itary expenditure would increase to around 10% of GDP and as Slater (2018)
notes each major war roughly doubles the national debt. The wars include the
Nine Years War, 1688-97; the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714; the
Wars of Jenkins’Ear & Austrian Succession, 1739-48; the Seven Years’War,
1756-63; and the American Revolutionary War, 1775-83, which also involved
conflicts with other countries. There then followed the French Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, which pushed the share of military expendi-
ture over 15%. This list does not include wars fought against Native American
tribes and by the East India Company.
From the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the debt-GDP ratio then declined
during the long "Victorian century" until the beginning of World War I, reaching
a minimum of 28% in 1913. Debt then increased with World War I and the inter-
war depression, rising further with World War II to a peak of 259% in 1946.
The share then declines again falling to a minimum of 22% in 1990, before rising
slowly at first, then sharply after 2008.
The government budget constraint, which will be discussed more formally
below, means that the government surplus or deficit, the difference between
revenue and expenditure (military and non-military), must be matched either
by changes in the money supply or changes in government assets and liabilities.
Thus an increase in military expenditure must be financed by some combination
of: reductions in other government expenditures; increased taxes; printing more
money; borrowing by issuing more debt; or selling assets. The UK national
debt was typically denominated in sterling but both World Wars had to be
financed by selling foreign assets and incurring dollar denominated debt to the
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US government. The UK only finished repaying its war debts to the US in 2006.
The UK experience does not suggest that high levels of debt are necessarily
bad. The UK debt-GDP ratio was almost 200% of GDP at the end of the
Napoleonic War and about 250% of GDP at the end of World War II. That high
debt did not inhibit the first industrial revolution and relatively rapid post World
War II growth. O’Brien (2017) says "Between the Peace of Paris (1763) and
the adoption of free trade (1846-49) the economy of the United Kingdom passed
through an accelerated phase of industrialisation and urbanisation, referred to
as the First Industrial Revolution. For more than a third of that time the
British state was: extracting and mobilizing resources (labour, capital, raw
materials, intermediate and consumption goods) for the purposes of: preparing,
waging and disengaging from warfare with enemies from the mainland of Europe,
failing to repress rebellions by colonists in the Americas, and defeating Indian,
Chinese and other armed forces in various parts of the world." Of course, one
could argue that the rate of growth during the British industrialisation was
rather low compared to countries that subsequently industrialised and the high
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Figure 1. UK national debt to GDP ratio, percentage 1700-2016.
Figure 2 shows the share of military expenditure in GDP. The early military
expenditure data are taken from Mitchell (1988) the GDP from Bank of England
(2017). The later shares of military expenditures in GDP are taken from SIPRI
(2019). As noted above the sequence of 18th century wars and the French
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Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are as apparent in the shares of military
expenditure as they are in the debt-GDP ratio. The period from 1815-1914
had a very low share of military expenditure around 2.5% of GDP, though
this financed many colonial wars which massively expanded the British Empire.
Between the Napoleonic wars and World War I there are two blips in the military
expenditure series . The first is associated with the Crimean War 1853-6 and
the Indian Mutiny/War of Independence 1857-8; the second with the Boer War
1899-1902. Then followed the massive peaks in expenditure associated with
World Wars I and II and a further blip associated with the Korean War. The
share of military expenditure remained high by historical standards during the
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Figure 2. Share of military expenditure in GDP 1700-2016.
The UK was not alone, throughout Europe the fiscal state was a response to
the costs of the wars that were required to secure borders, expand territory and
survive. In the famous phrase of Tilly (1975:42) "War made the state and the
state made war." As Ferguson (2001) documents, wars tended to be times of
fiscal innovation, when governments found new ways to raise revenues. Income
taxes were introduced in the UK during the French Revolutionary Wars, in 1798;
abolished after the war in 1816, but reintroduced in 1842 and expanded substan-
tially during World War I. US income taxes were introduced in 1861, during the
Civil War, rescinded after the war and then subsequently reintroduced. Wallis
(2000) discusses US government finance.
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The UK mainly financed its wars by issuing debt. During the 18th century
the national debt was described as Britain’s secret weapon in war. Following
the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694, an innovation copied from
the Netherlands, Britain had a well organised way of raising money. Unlike
most continental monarchs, Britain did not default; therefore it was able to
raise money on good terms at low interest rates. It could thus easily borrow
to finance its continental wars. Although a naval-power, Britain could afford
to subsidise allied European land-powers to do much of the fighting on the
continent. Ferguson (2001), argues that it was finance, as much as firepower,
that determined victory.
The UK fiscal-military state benefited from a positive feedback. 18th Cen-
tury Britain was a credible borrower because it had effective fiscal systems.
Parliament gave legitimacy to taxation. There was an effi cient tax collection
system, particularly of customs and excise. The Bank of England managed the
national debt effi ciently and debt holders had considerable political influence
giving credibility to commitments to repay. Because it had good credit, it could
borrow to finance wars. This money made it more likely that it would win the
war and be able to pay its creditors; raising its credit further. Its defeated en-
emies, however, were likely to default making it harder for them to borrow in
future. The main war that Britain lost, the American War of Independence, did
not cause default or weaken British credit. Although British credit during the
18th century was good and the debt was managed effi ciently, there was much
agonising over its financing as described by Slater (2018) and Ellison and Scott
(2019).
France seemed to have the advantage in resources. It was twice as big as
Britain, both in land and population, during the 18th century. But it had
ineffi cient fiscal systems; could only borrow on bad terms; so lost wars through
lack of money; defaulted and had even more problems borrowing. Bordo &
White (1991) compare British and French fiscal systems and note that the record
of British and French finance during the Napoleonic wars presents the striking
picture of the financially strong nation abandoning the gold standard, borrowing
heavily, and generating inflation; while the financially weaker country followed
more “orthodox”policies. This paradoxical behavior is explained by Britain’s
strong credibility as a borrower that allowed it to follow more flexible policies,
while France’s poor reputation for repayment forced reliance on taxation.
War and the national debt were closely linked to economic development.
For most of history violence has shaped the environment within which the eco-
nomic forces of supply and demand, production and trade have operated. The
need for protection meant that the flag followed trade or trade followed the
flag. Britain benefited from its strong navy and merchant fleet: controlling sea
routes, establishing monopolies like the East India Company and extending its
colonies. This mercantilist policy changed in the 19th century, when British en-
compassing interests and competitive advantages meant that it had incentives
to promote free trade and freedom of the seas. As Marx and Engels noted in
1848 in the Communist Manifesto “The cheap prices of its commodities are the
heavy artillery with which the bourgeoisie batters down all Chinese walls, with
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which it forces the barbarians intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitu-
late.”Marx and Engels may have been being ironic, since the cheap prices were
supported by real artillery in the first Anglo-Chinese Opium War. The British
went to war to maintain free trade in Opium after the Chinese tried to stop
the trade. The short war was ended by the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, the first of
what the Chinese call the unequal treaties.
3 Theory
Barro (1979, 1987) provides the basic theory. Wars are regarded as providing
exogenous and transitory variations in government spending. Certainly, no other
category of government expenditure goes through such large changes as the
increases in military expenditure at the beginning of a large war or reductions
at the end and there are serious issues in war finance: how to manage the large
variations in military expenditure. In both World Wars UK military expenditure
rose from around three per cent of GDP to around half of GDP and then fell
back by similar amounts after the wars. Barro argues that deficits are used to
smooth taxes in order to maintain expected constancy in tax rates. Thus there
is a positive effect on debt issue of temporary increases in government spending,
as in wartime. He examines the effects of changes in debt on interest rates, the
quantity of money, the price level, and budget deficits and finds that temporary
increases in government purchases, which showed up in the sample as increases
in military outlays during wars, had positive effects on long interest rates.
Over the UK sample of more than two hundred years, he found only two
examples of major budget deficits that were unrelated to wartime —one asso-
ciated with compensation payments to slave owners in 1835-36 and the other
with a political dispute over the income tax in 1909-10. His sample ended in
1918, later years would show more cases, in particular after the crisis of 2008.
Ahmed (1987) also uses British data from the 18th and 19th centuries to exam-
ine the role of net borrowing from abroad in financing temporary increases in
government spending associated with wars looking at the balance of trade and
terms of trade as well as debt. The results are quite sensitive to the sample
period and the treatment of government spending.
The government budget constraint is that net debt at the end of period t+1,
Dt+1 equals the primary deficit in t (the negative of the surplus St = Tt+1−Gt+1,
taxation less government expenditure, military and non-military), plus interest
on the previous periods debt, where Rt is the nominal interest rate, minus the
increase in money supply. That is:
Dt+1 = −(Tt+1 −Gt+1) + (1 +Rt+1)Dt − (Mt+1 −Mt).
Dividing through by nominal GDP, and using Yt+1 = (1 + gt+1)Yt where gt+1


















Notice that it is the ratio of the nominal interest rate to the nominal growth
rate that matters. Defining (1 + rt+1) = (1 +Rt+1) /(1 + gt+1) and using lower
case letters for shares, this can be written as:
dt+1 = −st+1 −
mt+1
1 + gt+1
kt−1 + (1 + rt+1)dt;
dt+1 = bt+1 + (1 + rt+1)dt
where bt = −(st +mtkt−1(1 + gt)) is the primary borrowing requirement, the
primary deficit less that financed by money growth.
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The transversality condition is that as h gets large the expectation of the





Et (dt+h) = 0. (2)
Given (2), the inter-temporal budget constraint is that the market value of







Bohn (2007) points out that (2) and (3) impose very little restriction on
the time series properties of bt or dt. The reason for this is that the i-period-
ahead conditional expectation of an mth-order integrated variable is at most
an mth-order polynomial of the time horizon. The discounting in (2) and (3)
is exponential in the time horizon. Exponential growth dominates polynomial
growth of any order. Hence the discount factor (1 + r)−i will asymptotically
dominate whenever debt is difference-stationary with any arbitrary order of
integration.
Solvency cannot be inferred from the statistical properties of debt, it is
an economic judgement that depends on the lenders expectations about the
behaviour of the borrowers, in particular the credibility of their commitment
to pay. Debt can grow rapidly as long as lenders expect to be paid. The UK
during wars was a credible borrower so debt could increase rapidly. If lenders
believe that the government is following a time inconsistent policy, and that it
will default in the future, the lenders would not acquire the debt. The central
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issue was continued payment of interest not repayment of the debt. For much of
this period UK debt took the form of Consols, which were issued in perpetuity,
the government need never redeem them. Taking advantage of very low interest
rates, the last Consols were redeemed in 2015.
Grossman & Han (1993, 1999) provide a theory of war finance and sov-
ereign debt. As emphasised above, the ability of a sovereign state to issue war
debt depends critically on the lenders’expectations about the servicing of these
debts. The lender faces two distinct risks. Firstly, there is the danger that the
borrower will default if defeated, the victor typically does not pay the debts of
the vanquished. Secondly, even if the borrower is not defeated, but suffer nega-
tive material consequences from the war, they may not fully service their debt.
Thus debt service is contingent on circumstances, a form of risk sharing between
lender and borrower, which provides the borrower some insurance. They show
that war debt provides complementary functions - inter-temporal consumption
smoothing through tax smoothing and risk sharing.
Grossman & Han argue that before World War II the desire to maintain a
trustworthy reputation for honoring war debts was an important factor in induc-
ing deflationary postwar monetary policies in both the UK and US. But after
World War II, the US and UK partially defaulted on their debt through inflation
because of differences in economic and political conditions. These included the
extension of the voting franchise, the increased economic and political power of
organized labor, and, perhaps most importantly, the large postwar demands on
national resources with which the servicing of World War Il debts had to com-
pete. Because these postwar developments were unforeseeable, but verifiable,
contingencies, the partial default on World War Il debts was excusable and,
accordingly, did not cause either the United Kingdom or the United States to
lose their trustworthy reputation.
4 Estimates
Long span UK data is used to examine the association between military expen-
ditures and the national debt and the extent to which there is an equilibrium
level of debt. The other variables, apart from the deficit, in the budget con-
straint will be included. These are the rate of growth of nominal income and the
nominal rate of interest, which appear in equation (1). We condition on these
determinants of debt and adopt a linear approximation to the budget constraint.
Notice that these regressions should be treated as descriptions of the process
not causal explanations.
The first reason that they cannot be given a causal interpretation is because
interest rates and growth rates are not exogenous, they are influenced by the
change in debt; though governments would have an idea of the likely effects on
growth and interest rates given the size of these changes in war time.2 Although
2 It is slightly anachronistic to imagine governments responding to GDP before World War
II, since there was no such measure then. However, they were very sensitive to claims on
resources and inflationary pressures.
9
one cannot judge exogeneity from Granger causality, in a second order VAR
1705-2016, the share of debt in GDP was Granger causal for the share of military
expenditure (high military expenditure and high debt persist together for quite
long periods) and real growth; but not for inflation and the long interest rate.
The second reason that it cannot be given a causal interpretation is that
governments always have choices in how they finance the military and may adopt
different choices at different times. For instance, Barro found that the effect of
military expenditure on the growth rate of money (bank notes) was positive only
during the two periods of suspension of the gold standard (1797-1821 and 1914-
1918). As long as convertibility of bank notes into specie was maintained, there
was no systematic relation between government spending and money growth
and inflation. Military spending may influence both the numerator and the
denominator of the debt-GDP ratio. Debt may be increased to finance the
military spending and the military spending may also boost GDP, if only because
it is a component of GDP.
Finally, the ability to borrow to finance its fighting may have encouraged
Britain to be more warlike.
We adopt a general to specific approach, starting from a second order ARDL
equation, which is robust to the variables being integrated of order up to two.
This makes the debt to GDP ratio a function of the share of military expenditure
in GDP, the long interest rate (the consol rate in the Bank of England database)
and the rate of growth of nominal GDP. A specification search then gave the
OLS results in Table 1. While there was no serial correlation, there was signifi-
cant heteroskedasticity and non-normality, so the equation was re-estimated by
maximum likelihood using GARCH(1,1) and a t distribution. Both ARCH and
GARCH terms were very significant and the estimated degrees of freedom of
the t distribution was 3.33, indicating very fat tails, excess kurtosis. However
the qualitative picture from the GARCH estimates is very similar to that from
OLS.3
Any adjustment towards equilibrium is very slow, less than 2% a year, at
which rate it would take over a century without shocks to remove 90% of the
disequilibrium. This slow speed of adjustment is consistent with the very slow
19th century reduction. There is a very substantial momentum effect, changes in
debt continue, the lagged change in the share of debt has a coeffi cient of about
a half. The change in the share of military expenditure is highly significant,
about three quarters of the change in the share of military expenditure gets
transformed into a change in the share of debt. Current growth has a strong
negative effect, which is what one would expect, lagged growth has a positive
effect which is more diffi cult to interpret, but this effect is smaller and the total
effect of growth is negative. Higher interest rates are associated with higher
debt as one might expect.
3While there is a better non-linear estimator, OLS remains the best linear unbiased es-
timator even if there is non-normality and GARCH, since with GARCH the unconditional
variance is constant as required by the Gauss-Markov Theorem.
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Table 1. Equations explaining the change in share of UK debt in GDP from
start date given until 2016, (with t ratios in parentheses).
∆dt OLS GARCH OLS OLS OLS OLS
start 1704 1704 1759 1920 1941 1976
c 0.028 -0.293 0.815 2.138 2.862 2.965
(0.03) (−1.3) (1.01) (1.2) (1.8) (1.8)
dt−1 -0.019 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019 -0.041 -0.030
(−3.9) (−5.0) (−3.5) (−1.9) (−3.0) (−1.3)
∆dt 0.444 0.510 0.551 0.613 0.542 0.763
(8.6) (11.1) (9.4) (6.8) (6.6) (6.5)
∆smt 0.777 0.688 0.752 0.542 0.559 3.834
(10.9) (12.0) (10.0) (5.7) (6.3) (1.8)
smt−1 0.269 0.270 0.192 0.138 0.263 0.602
(5.5) (6.4) (3.5) (1.8) (3.3) (0.74)
gt -0.845 -0.569 -1.069 -1.342 -1.049 -0.686
(−20.3) (−42.1) (22.8) (−13.9) (−7.0) (−3.8)
gt−1 0.368 0.283 0.612 0.866 0.589 0.481
(5.7) (8.9) (7.1) (4.9) (3.4) (2.5)
Rt−1 0.427 0.195 0.380 0.266 0.220 -0.238
(3.4) (5.0) (2.8) (1.2) (1.0) (−0.7)
R2 0.73 0.68 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.79
SER 3.96 4.35 3.69 3.74 2.97 2.06
One might question whether one should expect structural stability over such
a long period. A Quandt-Andrews single unknown breakpoint test was used to
find the main break. The equation was then re-estimated starting at the break-
point and the process repeated. The first break was identified as 1759. The
equation was then re-estimated over 1759-2016, the next main break identified
as 1920, then 1941 and finally 1976. The estimates for each of the subperiods
are given in Table 1. The results are quite consistent across the sub-periods,
though coeffi cients lose significance in the last period. The only change of sign
is for the interest rate in the last period, which is insignificant. The coeffi cients
for the change in the share of military expenditure and the lagged share are very
consistent, except for the last period when they become larger, but very impre-
cisely determined. This is because there was very little variation in military
expenditure in the final period.
5 Conclusion
This paper approaches the relationship between military expenditure and the
national debt from three perspectives: historical, theoretical and statistical.
The history of the economic and strategic interactions between military expen-
diture and national debt in the UK over the period 1700-2016 shows that the
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UK credibility as a borrower boosted its war fighting ability. The wars resulted
in very high debt-GDP ratios at the end of the Napoleonic and World Wars.
The theory suggests that the two variables are closely tied together because it
is optimal to finance temporary war time expenditures by debt, both for con-
sumption smoothing and for risk sharing reasons. The statistical analysis of
the long span historical data took advantage of the large amount of variation
in both debt and military expenditure. This may help identify connections be-
tween the variables, but also raises diffi cult questions about structural stability
and whether the factors that determine debt now are different from those in
the more distant past. Nonetheless, examination of the longer run data may be
informative. The estimates of the effect of military expenditure on the national
debt shows that until the most recent period there was a robust relationship
between the share of military expenditure and the change in national debt, re-
flecting debt financing of wars, even after controlling for nominal income growth
and the long interest rate. The statistical analysis is primarily descriptive, since
there are diffi cult issues of endogeneity and identification, though it is plausible
that the variations in military expenditure are largely exogenous. To under-
stand the causal elements in the long run simultaneous interactions between
growth, inflation, interest rates, debt and military expenditure requires a more
structural model. Constructing such a structural model would be a challenging
task.
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